The Turkish War of Independence According to the Reports and Analyses of the British General Staf

Abstract

The period of active combat between the Turkish Army and the Greek Army, which began with the First Battle of İnönü in January 1921, ended with the Great Offensive launched in August 1922. Closely monitoring the war between the Turkish and Greek armies from 1921 to 1922, the British General Staff prepared a series of reports and assessments, periodically submitting them to the Cabinet through the War Office. Upon examining the content of these reports, it is evident that the evaluations generally contained realistic analyses and important warnings, offering in-depth assessments from a military perspective. The General Staff, disapproving of the harsh occupation policies applied to Türkiye, was firmly opposed to the Greek Army’s occupation of Anatolia. The reports generally emphasized that the Greek Army should not be trusted and that they would not be victorious against the Turkish Army, advocating that, for the sake of British interests, it was better to be allies with the Turks rather than the Greeks. However, the accurate analyses and warnings made by the General Staff were ignored by Prime Minister Lloyd George, who supported the expansion of the Greek occupation in Anatolia. Lloyd George’s stance damaged Britain’s long-term strategic interests and adversely affected regional balances. These historically valuable reports are crucial for understanding the strategic mistakes in Britain’s policy towards Türkiye and their consequences. They provide an essential source for comprehending the course of the War of Independence and for highlighting the differing perspectives between British politicians and military leaders, thus offering a unique viewpoint on the events. In this context, the analyses of the British General Staff reveal not only the military strategies of the period but also the impact of political decisions on the ground.